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31I n t r o d u c t i o n
In most countries of the developed world, immigration, rather than natural increase, is now the
dominant source of population growth (see Figure 1). Nonetheless, the combination of low birth
rates and increasing life spans will in the future compel governments to either admit even more
working-age immigrants, or cope with the economic consequences of a declining share of working-
age people within the population. Those countries that choose to permit more immigration will
also need to decide whom to admit from among a vast available pool of potential immigrants
who diﬀer in age, culture, nationality, and skill level.
In this paper we focus on the last of these distinctions. We build an overlapping dynasties
model of the U.S. economy with two types of labor inputs, to demonstrate that skilled and
unskilled immigrants have profoundly diﬀerent welfare implications for the resident population.
We ﬁnd that if capital and skilled labor are complementary, there is a very large contrast
between the size of the immigration surplus that an inﬂux of high-skilled immigrants generates
when compared to the surplus generated by a similar sized inﬂux of low-skilled immigrants.
Furthermore diﬀerences in productivity between the two types of workers do not account for the
much larger surplus generated by skilled immigrants. Rather, because of the complementarity
between the labor of skilled immigrants and native owned capital, the pattern of changes in
factor returns is most propitious for the native population when the inﬂux of immigrants is
composed of skilled workers.
Until 1965, the United States allocated a set number of immigration visas to citizens of each
country. The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act replaced these country
quotas, as well as preferences for certain skilled occupations, with a system that made family uni-
ﬁcation the primary criterion for admission to the United States. Immediate relatives of United
States citizens enter without limit–in the year 2004, just over four hundred thousand arrived.
Other relatives of U.S. citizens are admitted as family-sponsored preference immigrants–since
1990 the limit for all family-sponsored immigrants has been either 226,000, or 480,000 minus the
number of people admitted under the category of immediate relatives during the previous year,
whichever is larger. By contrast, the number of visas for workers with special skills or training
(as well as investors) is much smaller–in 2000, the limit for employment-based preferences was
140,000.
The net rate of immigration to the United States has more than doubled since 1965, from
1.5 per thousand to an average of 3.2 per thousand during the 1990’s. The rules no longer
favor immigration from countries in Europe with levels of educational attainment similar to
those that prevail in the United States. Now people from less developed countries arrive legally
as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, family sponsored immigrants, or as illegal aliens (and





















































































Figure 1: The Sources of Population Growth in OECD countries, net migration versus, natural popu-
lation growth, decade averages for 1991-2000. Source: Organization of Economic Co-operation Develop-
ment, Components of Total Population Growth, Vol 2001.
3then legalize their status). Upon attaining citizenship, these immigrants bring their immediate
relatives, and sponsor members of their extended families, who in turn repeat the process once
they are naturalized. If in 1960, 75.0% of the foreign born population in the United States were
from Europe and 9.8% from Latin America, by 2000 the relative shares had reversed, reaching
15.3% and 51.0% respectively.
At one time, the public mostly concerned themselves with whether immigrants were too
successful when competing with natives for jobs. Today the focus has shifted to doubts about
whether, because of their lack of education, today’s immigrants have the skills necessary to
support themselves in a modern economy. Among immigrants from Latin America, 34.6%
have less than nine years of schooling, and the percentage with less than ﬁve years’ schooling
equals the percentage with at least a Bachelor’s degree–11.2%. More than half the Latin
American immigrants are from Mexico–48.4% of Mexican immigrants have less than nine years
of schooling, 16.5% less than ﬁve, and only 4.2% at least a Bachelor’s degree. Among native-
born Americans, 25.6% have at least a Bachelor’s degree and only 4% less than nine years of
schooling.
Not all newcomers are uneducated. Beginning in 1992, the United States began granting
65,000 visas to temporary workers with special skills–nearly all recipients of these H1-B visas
have college or advanced degrees. In 1998 Congress passed the American Competitiveness in
the Workforce Act, temporarily increasing the number of H1-B visas to 115,000 per year in 1999
and 2000, and 107,500 in 2001. The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century
Act of 2000 (AC21) added an extra 347,500 visas by raising the cap to 195,000 for each of the
years 2001, 2002, and 2003–for a total of 585,000 over three years.1 The visas themselves are
temporary, but after a few years in the United States, most of those admitted under the H1-B
visa program easily attain permanent residence status. The program has served in the recent
past as a signiﬁcant conduit for immigration by highly skilled workers.
In terms of educational attainment, immigrants are far more heterogeneous than the rest
of the U.S. population–the contrast between the average years of schooling attained by Latin
American immigrants arriving under the auspices of family uniﬁcation, and the recipients of H1-
B visas (two thirds of the total are from Asia) highlights the diversity of today’s immigration
ﬂows.2 The distinction between these two sources of immigration also demonstrates how Western
countries can design policies that determine, to a large degree, what kind of immigrants they
1In 2004 the number of visas returned to its original ceiling of 65,000.
2Overall, the most educated immigrants are from Africa (49.3% have at least a Bachelor’s degree and
17.4% graduate degrees) and Asia (44.9% have at least a Bachelor’s degree and 16.9% graduate degrees).
European immigrants occupy the middle ground–32.9% have at least Bachelor’s degrees but 12.7% have
less than nine grades of schooling.
4admit.
Australia, Canada, and the U.K. have long used point systems with weights for educational
attainment, language proﬁciency, and employment history to determine who may obtain work
permits and immigration visas. Many European countries, as well as Australia, are tightening
rules for those claiming political asylum to stem the ﬂow of unskilled immigrants, while also
experimenting with new schemes to attract workers with speciﬁcs k i l l s .
In a static economy with undiﬀerentiated labor (Borjas (1995)), immigrants generate higher
rates of return to capital, which more than compensates for concomitant drops in wages–
representative native households enjoy a small ‘immigration surplus’. Using Weil’s (1989) opti-
mal growth model with overlapping dynasties, Ben-Gad (2004) demonstrates that the immigra-
tion surplus is much smaller if capital accumulation and the labor supply are endogenous. In
Section 2, we extend the overlapping dynasties model to include skilled and unskilled workers,
each supplying a distinct type of labor. The number of each type of workers grows continuously
from natural increase, and a constant inﬂow of both skilled and unskilled immigrants.
We present in Section 3, our method for simulating changes in immigration policy as tempo-
rary perturbations to either one or both these inﬂows. Here, we also demonstrate how immigra-
tion’s impact on the economy can be divided between two main eﬀects. First, if immigrants of
either type own less than the prevailing amount of c a p i t a lp e rp e r s o n ,t h e i ra r r i v a ld i l u t e sp e r -
capita capital and temporarily raises its rate of return. Second, and far more important, even
temporary changes in immigration can permanently upset the skill composition of the overall
labor force. Capital’s rate of return may temporarily rise or fall, but because of the composition
eﬀect, the two wage rates do not necessarily return to their previous levels.
In Section 4, we introduce the nested constant elasticity of substitution production function
(Sato (1967) and Krusell et. al. (2000)), which combines the two types of labor with capital
to produce the single consumption good. We also brieﬂy describe the U.S. data and empirical
studies we use to parameterize the baseline model.
In Section 5, we use the model to consider how skilled and unskilled wages, and the rate
of return to capital behave following a decision by the U.S. government to raise the number of
either skilled or unskilled immigrants arriving in the country by an additional 29,500 each year,
over the course of a decade. This means that the ordinary net ﬂow of immigration to the United
States, on average 3.2 per thousand during the 1990’s, is augmented by an additional one per
ten thousand additional people for ten years only.
Weil’s framework permits us to isolate the welfare eﬀects of changes in immigration policy
by vintage of dynasty, as well as skill-type. To measure the welfare impact of a change in
the size and/or composition of future immigration ﬂows on the population already resident we
5use the impulse responses to calculate compensating diﬀerentials–the equivalent permanent
percentage changes in consumption that yield identical changes in utility–for members of these
‘native’ dynasties. In Section 6 we ﬁr s tc o n s i d e rh o wt h ei n ﬂux of additional skilled immigrants
aﬀects the welfare of skilled and unskilled members of native ‘dynasties’ separately, and then
calculate the immigration surplus–the overall aﬀect of the policy on the native population when
considered as a whole. The substitution elasticities Krusell et. al. (2000) estimate for the United
States economy, imply a high degree of complementarity between the labor supplied by skilled
immigrants and native-owned capital. Hence the immigration of skilled workers generates a
much larger surplus, than the surplus generated by an overall increase in immigration that does
not change the skill-composition of the population.
In the second half of Section 6, we analyze the welfare eﬀects of a same-sized inﬂux of un-
skilled immigration. These immigrants’ labor is a relative substitute for native—owned capital–
the return to capital rises but only by a small amount. For the baseline model, an unskilled
immigrant generates a surplus, that is just under a twelfth the surplus generated by a skilled
immigrant. Compressing or lengthening the time period over which a given number of immi-
grants arrive, does not change the welfare results. We also consider the eﬀect of diﬀerent-sized
increases and decreases in the rates of immigration on the immigration surplus.
Finally, in Section 7, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent parameteriza-
tions of the production function. Storesletten (2000) demonstrates that immigration by high-
skilled workers is beneﬁcial to natives, while unskilled immigration is harmful–all on purely
ﬁscal grounds. Likewise, given the growing empirical evidence in favor of capital-skill comple-
mentarities, we ﬁnd strong reasons to believe that skilled immigration is far more beneﬁcial to
the economy than unskilled immigration, abstracting from ﬁscal considerations.
For most developed countries, the marginal supply of both skilled and unskilled immigrants
from impoverished foreign countries is both very large and not very elastic–we do not model
the decision to move made by the immigrants themselves. Instead, the number and type of
immigrants are policy variables, regulated by the rationing of visas, or by the resources invested
in the prevention of illegal immigration.3
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Consider an economy in which new immigrants–both skilled and unskilled–join the economy
as founding members of new inﬁnite lived dynasties. Initially we assume that all present and
future members of a given dynasty supply inelastically only skilled labor lS, or unskilled labor
3See Galor (1986), Djajic (1989), and Borjas (1994) for models with endogenously determined patterns
of immigration.
6lU. Throughout we employ the subscript i ∈ {U,S} to distinguish between the two diﬀerent
types of dynasties. An immigrant of type i w h oa r r i v e di nt h ec o u n t r ya tt i m es, and his (or





e(ρ−n)(s−t) lnci (s,t)dt, i ∈ {U,S}, (1)
subject to a time t budget constraint:
·
ki(s,t)=wi(t)li +( r(t) − n)ki(s,t) − ci(s,t), ∀s,t, i ∈ {U,S}, (2)
where ci(s,t),and ki (s,t) represent the time t consumption and holdings of capital of the mem-
bers of a type i dynasty of vintage s, wi(t) and r(t) represent their time t wages and the rate
of return of capital, ρ is the subjective discount rate, and n is the rate of natural population
increase.
The consumption rule for dynasty s at time t is:





t (r(v)−n)dvwi(u)lidu is the present discounted value of all future income
from labor of type i from time t forward. Immigrant households of type i enter the economy
at time t at a rate of mi (t), and arrive with an average amount of capital, ki(t,t) ≥ 0, brought
from the old country. Aggregate consumption and capital evolve according to:
˙ Ci (t)=( ρ − n)
£





Ki (t)=wi(t)Li (t)+r(t)Ki (t) − Ci (t)+entMi(t)mi (t)ki(t,t), (5)
where Ci(t),K i(t),a n dΨi (t), are respectively, the time t consumption, physical capital holdings,
and the present value of future earnings aggregated over all the households with skill-level i,
and Mi (s) is the number of households with skill-level i that have accumulated by time s.4 A
labor enhancing technology growing at the rate x ensures the existence of steady state per-capita
output growth–total eﬀective labor input of type i at time t is Li (t)=e(n+x)(t−b)Mi (t)li.
The behavior of the economy is determined by four laws of motion for stationary per-capita
consumption ˜ ci (t)=
Ci(t)




˜ ci (t)=( r(t) − x − ρ)˜ ci (t) − (ρ − n)˜ ki (t)mi (t)κi (t) i ∈ {U,S}, (6)
4Deﬁne t = b as a date in the arbitrarily distant past b<0, when the economy was founded by an initial
cohort of size MU (b)+MS (b)=1 .T h e n Ci(t),K i(t),a n dΨi(t) are the consumption, capital and the future
earnings for the initial type i population at time b, and all the additional cohorts accumulated at rate mi (s)
since b, all growing at the rate of n. Hence Ci(t)=e
n(t−b) R t




b Mi (s)mi (s)ki(s,t)ds+e
n(t−b)Mi (b)ki(b,t), Ψi (t)=e
n(t−b)
³R t
b Mi (s)mi (s)ds + Mi (b)
´





˜ ki (t)= ˜ wi(t)li +( r(t) − x − n − mi (t)κi (t))˜ ki (t) − ˜ ci (t) i ∈ {U,S}, (7)
where κ(t)=
k(t)−k(t,t)
k(t) is the fractional diﬀerence between per-capita capital and the capital
imported by immigrants, and ˜ wi(t) is the stationary wage for type i. The production function
F : R3 → R is constant returns to scale in both types of labor and aggregate capital. Factors
receive their marginal products:
r(t)=FK
³





e kU (t)+η(t)e kS (t),l U,η(t)lS
´
, (9)
where δ is the rate of depreciation for physical capital, and η(t) is the ratio of skilled, MS (t)







3 Capital Dilution versus Changes in Population Composition
In this section we employ the perturbations method developed by Judd (1998), to demonstrate
that a change in the rate of immigration by either unskilled or skilled workers, aﬀects the
dynamic behavior of the model in two very diﬀerent ways. We deﬁne m as the initial steady
state rate of immigration for both skilled and unskilled workers, and replace mi (t) in (6)-(9),
with m +  πi (t), where πi (t) is a bounded dynamic perturbation to the rate of migration by
type-i workers, and   is a small positive number that regulates its magnitude.5
Deﬁning π = {πS (t),πU (t)}
∞
t=0, we assume that consumption and capital for each skill-type
are the functions of π and  : ˜ ci(t, ,π) and ˜ ki(t, ,π), i ∈ {U,S}. Diﬀerentiating (6) and (7)
with respect to   at the point   =0yields:

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∂
















(ρ − n)˜ kUκUπU (t)












˜ kUΩK + lUΩU







(πS (z) − πU (z))dz,
where J is a 4×4 Jacobian matrix, ˜ kU and ˜ kS are the initial steady state levels of capital holdings,












∂K∂LS.S o l v i n g
5To guarantee convergence to an interior balanced growth path we also impose the restriction on πS (t)
and πU (t) that lim
T→∞
R T
0 (πS (t) − πU (t))dt is ﬁnite.
8(10) yields a ﬁrst order approximation of the time paths of consumption and capital following
a change in immigration policy.
The shocks in (10) are separated into two diﬀerent vectors. The ﬁrst vector of perturbations
(the second vector on the right-hand side of (10)) contains the terms κU and κS,w h i c hr e g u l a t e
the fractional gap in capital-holdings between new immigrants and the rest of the population.
Unless κi is equal to zero, a change in the rate of immigration directly alters the capital-labor
ratio. Hence the ﬁrst vector of perturbations in (10) captures the degree to which immigrants
dilute (or deepen if κi < 0) the capital stock, and also tells us the patterns of consumption
and savings that prevail, until the accumulated changes in the capital stock match the overall
change in the size of the population. If πS (t)=πU (t) the change in both rates of immigration
is identical and the size of the population changes, but not its composition. Such overall ‘un-
diﬀerentiated’ changes in the rates of immigration are completely described by the ﬁrst vector
of perturbations in (10) alone. This is also the total eﬀect of immigration in a model with
homogenous labor as described by Borjas (1995) in his static model, and Ben-Gad (2004) in a
dynamic setting.
Diﬀerential changes in the rates of immigration–changes that aﬀect the ratio of skilled to
unskilled workers–necessitate further adjustments to the capital stock, beyond those induced by
the ﬁrst vector of shocks in (10). The terms ΩK, ΩU, and ΩS in the second vector of perturbations
in (10) (the third vector on the right-hand side), capture the means by which changes in the ratio
between skilled and unskilled immigrants directly aﬀect the returns to capital, unskilled wages,
and skilled wages respectively. Changes in factor returns induce changes in savings behavior,
until the stock of capital is exactly appropriate to the economy’s new mix of skills.
If a surge in immigration is temporary (πS (t) and πU (t) have bounded support), the elements
in the ﬁrst vector of perturbations in (10) are transitory and do not generate permanent changes
in any of the factor returns. By contrast, the elements of the second vector of perturbations
accumulate the diﬀerences between πS (t) and πU (t) and temporary surges in immigration
continue to aﬀect the economy through this channel long after the immigration surge itself has
ended. Indeed, the second perturbations vector generates permanent changes in wages, whereas
the eﬀect of the ﬁrst vector on wages begins to dissipate once the surge in immigration ceases.
Hence the former and not the latter, ultimately accounts for the lion’s share of immigrants’
impact on factor returns and welfare.
When simulating the impact of immigration on factor returns, and their subsequent impli-
cations for native welfare–we always distinguish between the total impulse responses generated
by π on (10), and the eﬀects of a corresponding level of undiﬀerentiated immigration operating
through the ﬁrst vector of shocks alone.
9Solving (10) yields ﬁrst order approximations of the dynamic behavior of the model, adequate
for predicting the behavior of factor returns but not suﬃciently accurate for welfare measure-
ments unless the proposed policy changes are extremely small. Diﬀerentiating (6) and (7) twice
with respect to   at the point   =0 , and then three times yields third order approximations of
the models variables: ˜ ci(t, ,π)=˜ ci +   ∂
∂ ˜ ci(t, ,π)+1
2 2 ∂2
∂ ∂ ˜ ci(t, ,π)+1
6 3 ∂3
∂ ∂ ∂ ˜ ci(t, ,π) and







∂ ∂ ∂ 
˜ ki(t, ,π), i ∈ {U,S},w h e r e˜ ci and
˜ ki are the initial steady state values of consumption and capital holdings for each type i (see
Appendix).6
4 Parameterizing the Baseline Model
4.1 The Nested CES Production Function
Empirical studies–starting with Griliches (1969)–typically ﬁnd that the elasticity of substitu-
tion between skilled labor and capital is substantially lower than that between unskilled labor
and capital. Subsequent work by Berndt and Christensen (1974), and Denny and Fuss (1977)
conﬁrmed Griliches’ ﬁndings.
To permit the elasticity of substitution between capital and the two diﬀerent types of labor
to diﬀer, we employ the nested constant elasticity of substitution aggregate production function
developed by Sato (1967):
F (K (t),L U (t),L S (t)) =
h
αLU (t)
ϑ +( 1− α)(βK(t)







where K (t)=KU (t)+KS (t) is the total stock of capital.7 For the nested CES production
function, the Allen-Hicks elasticities of substitution between unskilled labor LU and the other
two factors, skilled labor LS and capital K, are identical: σUS = σUK = 1
1−ϑ. The Allen-
Hicks elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor is a function of factor shares,
however following Krusell et. al. (2000) we employ a simpliﬁed deﬁnition of elasticity: σSK =
1
1−γ.8 Fallon and Layard (1975) measured the parameters of the nested CES function (11).
6Because the sets of equations for each type are similiar, the condition number of the 4×4 Jacobian
matrix can be very high–leading to innacurate results. For numerical simulations we replace the two
equations in (6) with a law of motion for the logarithm of consumption for unskilled households aU (t)=




7Also known as the two stage CES production function. The ﬁrst stage combines skilled labor and
raw capital to develop and maintain production capital: K∗ =( λKγ +( 1− λ)(HS)
γ)
1
γ .K ∗ is used by
unskilled labor in the second stage to manufacture ﬁnal goods: Y =
h
µ(HU)





Goldin and Katz (1998).
8For the nested CES function the Allen-Hicks partial elasticity of substitution between capital and
10Preferences, Technology and Factor Shares:
r(0) = .04 ρ chosen to match 4% initial rate of return on capital.
x = .02 Average U.S. per-capita growth rate: 1991-2000.†
δ = .045 Average rate of depreciation on ﬁxed assets: 1991-2000.†
γ=-.495, ϑ=.401 Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull, and Violante (2000).
φK= .282 The average share of capital in U.S. National Income: 1991-2000.†
α=.427, β=.781 Matches the values of φK, and 4% rate of return on capital.
Population:
n = .0067 Average U.S. natural rate of population growth: 1991-2000.‡
mS= mU= .0032 Average U.S. rate of net migration: 1991-2000.‡
κS= κU=1 Immigrants arrive without physical capital.
η (0)= .344 Ratio of population with/without college degrees.‡
d =2 .7 Ratio of initial earnings and wealth.
for households with/without college degrees.‡§
Table 1: Paramaterization of Baseline Model. †Bureau of Economic Analysis. ‡U.S. Census Bureau.
§1998 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Deﬁning a skilled worker as someone with more than eight years of education, for their full
sample of 23 countries, they estimated ϑ to be .33 and γ to be -2.45, implying partial elasticities
of substitution of σUK =1 .49 and σSK = .29. For a restricted sample of rich countries the
estimates were ϑ=. 4 6a n dγ = -.81, or σUK =1 .85 and σSK = .55. For our baseline model, we
adopt the parameter estimates found by Krusell et. al. (2000) for the U.S. economy. We deﬁne
a skilled worker as someone with at least a four-year Bachelor’s Degree, and for the baseline
model set ϑ= .401 and γ =−.495 (σUK =1 .67 and σSK = .67).9








where φSK is the combined share of aggregate capital and skilled
labor in production.
9Lindquist (2003) ﬁnds very similar results for the Swedish economy. For the full sample of countries
the implied Allen-Hicks elasticity in Fallon and Layard’s (1975) study is -.49 or -.29 when the sample is
restricted to rich countries, and for Krusell et. al., (2000) the Allen-Hicks partial elasticity of substitution
between capital and skilled labor is .36. By comparison, Berndt and Christensen (1974) estimate a
translog production function–their estimates are: σUK =3 .72, σSK = −3.77,a n dσUS =7 .88.R a t h e r
than counting years of schooling, the authors distinguish between production and non-production workers,
and assume that the latter group is more skilled. A similar study by Denny and Fuss (1977) ﬁnds
σUK =2 .86, σSK = −1.88,a n dσUS =4 .76 when the production function is estimated, and σUK =1 .5,
σSK = −.91,a n dσUS =2 .06 when a cost function is used. Finally, Polgreen and Silos (2005), reestimate
the Krussel et. al. (2000) model use Baysian estimation techniques, and two alternative measures of the
capital equipment stock, ﬁnd that the value of σUK ranges from 2.087 to 9.052, and the value of σSK
ranges from 0.607 to 0.857.
114.2 U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1990
Most legal immigrants arrive in the United States through some form of family sponsorship.
Immediate relatives of United States citizens may enter without limit; during the 1990’s about
a quarter of a million arrived each year. Other relatives of U.S. citizens are admitted as family-
sponsored preference immigrants–the Immigration Act of 1990 set the limit for all family spon-
sored immigrants as either 226,000, or 480,000 minus the number of people admitted under
the category of immediate relatives during the previous year, whichever is larger. The United
States also allocates 140,000 employment-based preference visas for workers with special skills
or training (as well as investors), and an additional 55,000 visas are allocated by lottery under
the diversity program. Finally, the United States admits refugees and asylum seekers (refugees
are admitted from abroad on the basis of a yearly quota set annually by the president). After
a year, refugees and asylees are eligible for permanent residence–between 1991 and 2000 just
over one million were admitted.
In addition to immigration visas, in 1992 the United States began granting, 65,000 H-1B
visas to temporary workers with special skills–nearly all recipients have college or advanced
degrees.10 To ameliorate a perceived shortage of qualiﬁed workers in the information technology
sector, Congress passed the American Competitiveness in the Workforce Act of 1998, temporarily
increasing the number of visas to 115,000 per year in 1999 and 2000, and 107,500 in 2001. The
American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21) added an extra
347,500 visas by raising the cap to 195,000 for each of the years 2001, 2002, and 2003, for a total
of 585,000 over three years. The cap for 2004 and beyond is once again 65,000.
Finally, the gross inﬂow of illegal immigrants is about 350,000 per year.11 The net increment
to the population from this source is smaller–eighty percent of those who leave the United
States are foreign born and a substantial fraction of these are illegal aliens returning home. In
the year 2000 there were approximately seven million people living in the United States illegally,
of whom 1.5 million arrived between 1991 and 2000–a net inﬂow of 150,000 per year.12
In total, the net rate of migration to the United States between 1991 and 2000 was 3.2 per
thousand. Although a much larger fraction of immigrants have less than nine years of schooling,
the percentage of the foreign-born with Baccalaureate degrees closely matches that of the general
10H-1B visas are granted for a maximum of two consecutive three-year stays. However, workers are no
longer required to demonstrate an intention to return to their home countries and most recipients are
soon eligible to apply for permanent residency. In the past at least half of those admitted under the
program changed status and ultimately became permanent residents (see Lowell (2001)).
11U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Oﬃce of Immigration Statisitics, 2002 Yearbook of Immigra-
tion Statistics.
12U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Oﬃce of Policy and Planning, Estimates of the Unau-
thorized Immigration Population Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000.
12population–25.8% of foreign-born people in the United States over the age of 25 have college
degrees, as compared to 25.6% of the total U.S. population. For the initial stock of skilled and
unskilled workers we set MS (0) = .256 and MU (0) = .744 and set the steady state rates of
immigration for both skill types to mS = mU = .0032.13 We further assume that all immigrants
arrive in the United States after having exhausted any savings on travel expenses or establishing
ah o u s e h o l d – w es e tκS = κU =1 . If the rates of legal and illegal immigration to the United
States during the decade of the 1990’s carry forward, and the rate of out migration continues to
hold steady at one per thousand, foreign migration will augment the U.S. population with close
to ten million additional people over the course of this decade.
4.3 The Baseline College Premium and Distribution of Capital
We choose the other parameters of the model to match U.S. data in steady state. The ratio
of mean earnings and income for households as well as individuals with bachelor’s degrees to
those without, range from 2.13 and 2.71 as measured by the U.S. Census. The 1998 Survey of
Consumer Finances reports on net wealth as well as income and earnings. The ratio of mean
earnings is 2.35, income is 2.3 while net wealth is 3.3. The gap between median earnings and
wealth is smaller–2.4 versus 3.06. In steady state, the ratio of capital held by skilled and
unskilled agents must be equal to the ratio of their wages–we choose an intermediate number
2.7 for our simulations.
5 Temporary Surges in the Rate of Immigration
5.1 Raising Skilled Immigration for Ten Years
Suppose the United States government were to announce that it will permit the overall rate of
immigration to immediately rise from 3.2 to 3.3 per thousand, but only for one decade. This
corresponds to a decision to allocate an additional two hundred and ninety-ﬁve thousand visas,
so that instead of absorbing approximately nine million six hundred thousand new immigrants
over the course of a decade, about nine million nine hundred thousand immigrants arrive. How
would the increased inﬂux aﬀe c tt h ee c o n o m y ?H o wm u c hw i l lt h et y p eo fi m m i g r a n t s ,w h e t h e r
13At the high end, graduate education declines slightly with the degree of nativity: 9.7% of the foreign
born have graduate degrees, as do 8.9% of natives with foreign-born parents, but only 8.2% of natives
with native-born parents. Grade school education rises more steeply with nativity–22.2% of the foreign-
born and 10.1% of the natives with foreign-born parents have less than nine grades of schooling (7.2% of
the foreign-born have less than ﬁve), against only 4.5% with less than nine grades among the native-born
population with native parents (See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Proﬁle of the
Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2000, December 2001).
13they are skilled or unskilled, aﬀect the results?
Once again we deﬁne the rate of immigration as mi (t)=m +  πi (t), i ∈ {U,S}.T h e
increase in the overall rate of immigration is  .D e ﬁne µS as the fraction of additional im-
migrants that are skilled workers, and T as the duration of the immigration surge. The dy-
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U (T − t),w h e r e
the function U is the unit step indicator function.14
First, we consider what happens to factor returns, if all the additional two hundred and
ninety-ﬁve thousand visas are allocated over the decade to skilled immigrants only–we set
µS =1 ,   =0.0001, and T=10, and then calculate the behavior of unskilled wages, skilled wages
and the rate of return to capital. The solid lines describe the impulse responses generated by
both perturbation vectors in (10)–the change in the behavior of factor returns that results from
the surge of additional immigration.
We generate the curves with dashes by setting µS = MS (0).I n t h i s c a s e πS (t)=πU (t),
and the impulse responses represent the eﬀects of the ﬁrst perturbations vector in (10) alone.
This is the behavior of factor returns if the same sized immigration surge is not biased towards
either type of worker, but rather matches the pre-existing distribution of skilled and unskilled
workers in the United States. In other words, the dashed curves illustrate the eﬀects of an
alternative policy–admitting during the decade just under an additional seventy-ﬁve thousand
skilled, together with nearly two hundred ﬁfteen thousand unskilled immigrants. We emphasize
the area between the solid and dashed curves in Figure 2 in gray. This is the eﬀect of the new
immigration policy, abstracting from the mere change in the overall size of the population–the
net change in factor returns resulting from the increase in the relative share of skilled workers
from 25.6% to 25.6744%.
The arrival of extra skilled immigrants causes skilled wages to immediately begin declining
(Panel a) of Figure 2). In the long-run, long after the surge of additional immigration has
passed, and the economy has converged to its new steady state, the supply of skilled workers has
increased .39% above its previous trend and skilled workers’ wages–detrended for exogenous
technological growth–has declined by just over .15%. Thus the long-run wage elasticity for
skilled workers is .39–close to the .4 weekly wage elasticity (across all skill groups) measured
by Borjas (2003). However, towards the end of the decade, as the last of the extra immigrants
are arriving, the decline in skilled wages is far more substantial–almost .3%.
Why does the drop in skilled wages initially overshoot its long-run value? Sixty-ﬁve percent
14The Unit Step function U (x) takes the value zero if x ≤0a n do n ei fx>0. Therefore U (10 − t) is
equal to zero if t> 10 and to one if t ≤10.
14of the overshooting occurs because the economy fails to accumulate capital at a pace suﬃcient
to compensate for capital dilution that results from the increase in the size of the work force,
until the last of the extra immigrants has arrived. The remainder of the overshooting–thirty-
ﬁve percent–results from the delay in accumulating the capital necessary to accommodate the
changed composition of the workforce–a workforce whose labor is now more complementary to
capital. Only in the long run, can higher savings provide the economy with the extra capital
required to accommodate both the relatively sudden jump in the size of the work force, and also
its changed composition.
As the enhanced ﬂow of skilled workers continues, the labor unskilled workers provide be-
comes relatively more scarce; the unskilled wage in Panel b) of Figure 2 rises until it is just
.14% higher than it would be otherwise. Capital dilution slightly detracts from their gains–
capital complements unskilled labor even though the two factors are also relative substitutes.
Overall, wage inequality declines. In the initial steady state equilibrium, workers with college
degrees earn 170% more than their unskilled counterparts. The temporary surge in immigration
eventually reduces this premium to 169.2%.
In Borjas (1995), an inﬂux of capital-poor immigrants permanently lowers the capital-labor
ratio, and by permanently raising its rate of return, generates a small surplus for native owners
of capital. In this model, capital supply is endogenous, so temporary inﬂuxes do not aﬀect
its long-run rate of return, and as in Ben-Gad (2004), the impact of capital dilution alone is
modest–just under three-tenths of a basis point at its peak, if both rates of immigration rise by
the same amount. By contrast the impact of skilled immigration is almost three times greater–
almost nine-tenths of a basis point in year ten. Capital-skill complementarity generates the
entire gray-colored gap between the two curves in Panel c) of Figure 2. As we demonstrate
in Section 6, these higher rates of return imply that most of the native population derives a
substantial beneﬁtf r o mt h i st y p eo fi m m i g r a t i o n .
5.2 Raising Unskilled Immigration for Ten Years
Does an inﬂux of the same number of unskilled immigrants generate similar, perhaps symmetric
patterns in the behavior of factor returns? Not completely. We once again set   =0.0001,T =1 0 ,
but µS =0 . Figure 3 presents the response of factor returns when all the additional two hundred
and ninety-ﬁve thousand immigrants are unskilled.
By the end of the decade the policy raises the supply of unskilled labor by slightly over .13%
above its previous path. Unskilled wages in Panel b) of Figure 3 drop by just under .05% in the
long run, and slightly more than .05% in the short run.15 Once again the own-wage elasticity
15A sw es e ei nT a b l e5b e l o w ,t h eA l l e nH i c k so w nw a g epartial elasticities of complementarity for
15Figure 2: The total rate of immigration increases from 3.2 to 3.3 per thousand per annum, for ten years
only, and all the additional immigrants are members of households with skilled workers. The solid curves
are the total impulse responses of factor returns from (10). The curves with the short dashes are the
impulse responses generated by (10) when the rates of immigration for the skilled and unskilled both
rise. The gray areas between the two curves isolate the overall inﬂuence of changes in the composition,
rather than the size of the population. The impulses in Panels a) and b) are the fractional deviations of
the de-trended wage from the initial balanced growth path. For the rates of return to capital in Panel
c), the horizontal axis is the baseline rate of 4%.
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aL Skilled Wagesroughly matches the estimates in Borjas (2003).
The increase in the share of unskilled workers dampens the eﬀects of capital dilution on
factor returns. More importantly, capital dilution no longer oﬀsets the increase in unskilled
wages as in Figure 2, but rather in Figures 3 exacerbates their decline. Because the share of
unskilled in the work force increases, the economy responds by adjusting downward, rather than
upward, the long-run capital-labor ratio.
The long-run wage for skilled workers rises by just over a twentieth of one percent. Capital
dilution dampens the short-term rise in skilled wages, causing it to increase monotonically,
without achieving the temporary peak it would have otherwise. Despite the diﬀerences in
magnitudes, overall immigration by skilled or unskilled workers produces a roughly symmetric
qualitative pattern of changes in the diﬀerent wages. The surge in unskilled immigration, though
temporary, raises the long-run college premium to 170.03%.
When the additional immigrants are skilled, capital skill complementarity and capital dilu-
tion raise in tandem, the rate of return to capital. By contrast, if the immigrants are unskilled,
the relative substitutability between capital and unskilled labor counteracts the positive eﬀect of
capital dilution, dragging down the rate of return to capital in Panel c) of Figure 3. At its peak,
in year ten, the rate of return rises by a mere tenth of a basis point–a small fraction of the rise
induced by immigration of the same number of skilled workers. By the same token, a decision
to lower the number of unskilled immigrants arriving in the United States, by two hundred
ninety-ﬁve thousand, over the course of a decade, lowers the rate of return by approximately
the same, very small amount.
How can the contribution of unskilled immigration to capital’s rate of return be so small? On
one hand, by abstracting from the many diﬀerent types of physical, and organizational capital,
we no doubt miss the serious harm that the imposition of severe restrictions on the immigration
of unskilled workers will cause certain sectors of the U.S. economy. On the other hand, for owners
of the types of capital that might replace some of these workers in the production process, a
drop in the number of unskilled immigrants will prove beneﬁcial. At the aggregate level, given
the elasticities of substitution found by Krusell et. al. (2000), we conclude that overall, the
common perception that unrestricted immigration by low-skilled workers strongly serves the
overall interests of a country’s rentier class deserves serious reexamining.
the baseline model are much higher (in absolute value) for skilled than unskilled workers. However, the
long-run equilibrium wage elasticities generated by the model are approximately the same across the two
groups, and close to the elasticities measured by Borjas (2003).
17Figure 3: The total rate of immigration increases from 3.2 to 3.3 per thousand per annum, for ten years
only, and all the additional immigrants are members of households with unskilled workers. The solid
curves are the total impulse responses of factor returns from (10). The curves with the short dashes are
the impulse responses generated by (10) when the rates of immigration for the skilled and unskilled both
rise. The gray areas between the two curves isolate the overall inﬂuence of changes in the composition,
rather than the size of the population. The impulses in Panels a) and b) are the fractional deviations of
the de-trended wage from the initial balanced growth path. For the rates of return to capital in Panel
c), the horizontal axis is the baseline rate of 4%.
18
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aL Skilled Wages5.3 An Overall Rise in Immigration for Ten Years
Consider once again, the across the board increase in immigration that permits an additional
seventy-ﬁve thousand skilled, and two hundred and twenty thousand unskilled immigrants to
enter the United States over the course of ten years; these are the impulses represented by the
dashed curves in both Figures 2 and 3. The rate of return to capital rises by just over four-tenths
of a basis point which is more than four times higher than if all the immigrants are unskilled,
but less than half as high as when all the immigrants are skilled. Both types of wages decline
but they do not decline at the same rate–skilled labor is relatively more complementary to
capital, hence the temporary drop in per-capita capital causes skilled wages to decline by .045%
in year ten, whereas unskilled wages decline by less than .015%. Therefore an overall rise in
immigration that merely replicates the pre-existing distribution of the labor force temporarily
lowers both types of wages while reducing the gap between them.
5.4 Changing the Duration of the Impulses
Changing the number of immigrants that continuously arrive over the course of ten years, simply
scales up or down the factor returns’ impulse responses. What happens if the duration of the
policy is no longer ten years? What happens to factor returns, if the country absorbs the same
two hundred and ninety-ﬁve thousand skilled immigrants over the course of a single year? Or
ﬁfteen? Because capital supply is endogenous, immigration surges aﬀect wages in the long-run
only if they alter the long-run ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. Hence the long-run impact of
a surge of immigration on wages is a function of its overall size and composition, and not the rate
at which it occurs. However, the shorter the duration of time between the policy announcement
and the arrival of the last of the additional immigrants, the less time capital has to adjust, and
the greater the short-run impact on wages.
Consider what happens if the entire surge in immigration is concentrated within a span of
three years. In Figure 4, the arrival of nearly an additional hundred thousand skilled immigrants
per year, causes skilled wages to drop by nearly .35% by year three. If the identical number
of skilled immigrants is evenly spread across a ﬁfteen year interval, the maximum drop in the
skilled wage is just over .25% in year ﬁfteen.
Similarly, the rate of return to capital begins to gradually fall to its previous value of 4%,
once immigration for both types reverts to its previous rate of 3.2 per thousand. Nonetheless,
the shorter the duration of time over which a given surge of skilled immigration is concentrated,
the more the immigrants overwhelm the ability of the economy to adequately adjust its capital
stock through additional savings. If two hundred and ninety-ﬁve thousand additional skilled



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5by 1.3 basis points in Figure 4. If the same number arrive gradually over the course of ﬁfteen
years, the rate of return adjusts gradually as well, reaching a peak of less than four tenths of
an additional basis point before beginning its descent. The more the time over which skilled
immigrants arrive is compressed, the more intensely immigrants compete in the labor market
to work with the existing capital stock, and the more the rate of return on capital rises at the
expense of skilled wages.
To accommodate the additional two hundred ninety ﬁve thousand unskilled workers, a rise of
.1%, aggregate capital ultimately rises by only .035% and per-capita capital declines by .065%.
Accommodating the same-sized inﬂux of skilled immigrants requires an increase of .295%—more
than eight times larger and per-capita capital increases by .195%. That is why the short-run
own-wage elasticity of unskilled workers in Panel b) of Figure 5 is far less sensitive to changes in
the duration of unskilled immigration. The overall eﬀect of unskilled immigration on the return
to capital is small because the labor force composition eﬀect counteracts, rather than reinforces,
the positive eﬀect on the rate of return from capital dilution.
6W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
Changes in immigration policy aﬀect the welfare of the already resident, or ‘native’ population
through their impact on all the diﬀerent factor returns. In this section, we quantify these welfare
eﬀects in terms of compensating diﬀerentials. For members of a household with workers of skill
level i, already resident in the country when the new policy is announced, the consumption
path that follows the policy announcement is ci(0,t)=e
R t
0(r(v)−ρ)dvci(0),w h e r eci(0) is per-
capita consumption at the moment that follows the announcement of the change in policy. We
equate the utility derived from this time path of consumption, multiplied by a constant value
(1 − pi/100), to that obtained from consumption under a counterfactual assumption that the
old policy was maintained ¯ ci (0,t):
Z ∞
0
e−(ρ−n)t ln[ci (0,t)(1− pi/100)]dt =
Z ∞
0
e−(ρ−n)t ln¯ ci (0,t)dt. (12)
Solving for the compensating diﬀerential pi,i∈ {U,S} yields:








which is the percentage permanent increase in consumption that exactly compensates resident
households of type i, for the government’s decision to deviate from its previous immigration
policy. Calculating compensating diﬀerentials provides a convenient way to weigh the relative
eﬀects of the changes in the diﬀerent factor returns–particularly when wages and the return on





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Consider once again, an across the board increase in immigration that permits an additional
seventy-ﬁve thousand skilled, and two hundred twenty thousand unskilled immigrants to enter
the United States over the course of ten years. In an economy with homogenous labor, the
complementarity between immigrant labor and native-owned capital generates a welfare im-
provement for natives–what Borjas (1995) calls an immigration surplus–because the rise in
the return to native-owned capital more than compensates for the drop in their wages. The
beneﬁt is small, and smaller still, if the supply of capital and labor is endogenous, as in Ben-
Gad (2004). Similarly, in an economy with skilled and unskilled workers, as well as capital,
and elasticities of substitution equal between all the diﬀerent inputs, across the board rises in
immigration generate small welfare improvements for both skilled and unskilled natives.
However, if there is a higher degree of complementarity between skilled labor and capital,
than between unskilled labor and capital, the temporary drop in per-capita capital that typically
accompanies a surge of immigration reduces skilled wages more than it reduces unskilled wages.
This is why (in the entries in the next-to-last two rows, ﬁrst column of Table 2), though both
types enjoy the same proportional rise in capital income, the unskilled derive a small beneﬁt,
the equivalent of a permanent rise of 0.0028% in consumption at the expense of skilled natives
who suﬀer a small loss, equivalent to a 0.0024% drop in permanent consumption.
Despite the heterogeneity of the native population, it is still possible to calculate an overall
immigration surplus–we deﬁne it as the compensating diﬀerential for a household whose labor
income is derived from both skilled and unskilled labor in proportions that match the distribution








e−(ρ−n)t ln[MS (0)¯ cS (0,t)+MU (0)¯ cU (0,t)]dt,
which yields p as a weighted average of pS and pU :
p =
MS (0)cS (0)pS + MU (0)cU (0)pU
MS (0)cS (0) + MU (0)cU (0)
. (15)
We can interpret p as the average between pS and pU, weighted by their respective shares in
the native population at the time of the policy announcement, a number that reﬂects both the
change in national income, and the ability of one group to compensate the other, and still enjoy
part of the beneﬁt from the new policy.16
16Another way to measure the welfare eﬀects of this policy is to calculate the beneﬁt to unskilled workers,
after they compensate their skilled counterparts for the losses to their welfare. To fully compensate the








































































Table 2: Welfare eﬀects generated by a year increase in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.3 per
thousand during one decade only.
The across the board decade-long rise in the rate of immigration of one per ten-thousand per
generally, comparing consumption paths to a baseline, we deﬁne qh as the net welfare beneﬁt a household



















e−(ρ−n)t ln[¯ ch (0,t)]dt.
Combining with (12) and (13), and replacing ci(0,t) with e
R t
0 (r(v)−ρ)dvci(0) for i ∈ {h,j} yields:
qh =
Mh (0)ch (0)ph + Mj (0)cj (0)pj
Mh (0)ch (0) + Mj (0)cj (0)pj
,h 6= j.
The denominator is the initial amount of consumption enjoyed by h after having compensated j.T h e
numerator is identical to the numerator in (15)–the sum of the welfare eﬀects of the policy, weighted
by population shares, and the time t =0levels of consumption of each type. For typically small values
of pU or pS it determines the sign of qh. Hence if the value of p i sp o s i t i v e ,t h e nb o t hv a l u e so fqh are
positive as well, one group can always compensate the other’s losses. The policy of raising the overall
rate of immigration by one per ten thousand for both skill types during a single decade, yields a value
of qU=0.0005%–the permanent increase in consumption enjoyed by unskilled natives, after they have
transfered enough resources to skilled natives to leave them indiﬀerent between the new and old policies.
24annum, generates an immigration surplus of 2.7 × 10−4%. How much is this worth? If annual
private consumption in the United States was $8.23 trillion in the year 2004, the decade-long rise
in the rate of immigration for both skilled and unskilled workers from 3.2 to 3.3 per thousand
generates a permanent beneﬁt of $24 million per year, the equivalent of a one time payment of
$576 million.
Now consider the same-sized inﬂux of additional immigrants, but all of them skilled workers.
The gain to unskilled natives is worth a permanent increase in consumption of 0.1241%–forty-
ﬁve times higher than if the inﬂux matches the economy’s initial skill distribution. Not only do
they enjoy a much more substantial increase in the income from the capital they own, but also a
rise, rather than a decline in their earnings. Skilled workers also experience a rise in their capital
income, but the losses in wage income are deeper, and the loss in welfare of 0.1319% is ﬁfty-
ﬁve times greater than the losses sustained by skilled natives when both rates of immigration
increase.
Taking a weighted average over both skill-types, the average long-run de-trended wage
declines by 0.088% while by the tenth year, the rate of return to the pre-existing capital stock
increases by 0.2245%. In addition natives exploit the opportunity to augment their capital hold-
ings by 0.06% through higher savings, adding an additional increment to their long-run capital
income.17 As before, and as is the case for models with homogenous labor, the rise in the rate
of return to capital dominates the drop in wages. The diﬀerence is that if all the additional
immigrants are skilled the immigration surplus is 0.001%–equivalent to a permanent rise in
consumption of $84 million, or a one time payment of just over two billion dollars. Hence, a
rise in immigration that is completely skewed towards skilled workers, yields a beneﬁta l m o s t
three and half times larger than that obtained from an increase in immigration, which merely
replicates the veteran population and the pre-existing ﬂow of new arrivals.
Finally, consider the welfare eﬀects of the same increase in the number of immigrants, but
now the increase is composed entirely of unskilled workers. The native unskilled suﬀer losses in
welfare equivalent to a drop of 0.0397% as the very small rise in the rate of return to their capital
cannot possibly compensate for the decline the in their wages. The loss is smaller than that
sustained by skilled workers when all the additional immigrants are skilled, because the overall
share of unskilled workers in the economy is nearly three times larger. The gains to skilled
workers under this policy are smaller as well–equivalent to a permanent rise in consumption of
0.0428%.
How do natives fair on average? The value of p falls to 8.1×10−5%–the equivalent of a
17The long-run increase in capital is the same for both types of natives, but short-run, capital-holdings
by unskilled natives slightly overshoots as they smooth income by saving more of their increased income
immediately.
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Figure 6: The compensating diﬀerentials, pS and pU from (13), and immigration surplus p from (15),
generated by an increase of one per-ten thousand in the rate of immigration, from 3.2 to 3.3 per thousand
as a function of the fraction of the additional immigrants that are skilled.
26yearly rise in total consumption of seven million dollars, or a one time payment of $183 million.
This means that the overall surplus generated by an unskilled immigrant is slightly less than a
twelfth the surplus generated by a skilled immigrant–a substantial diﬀerence considering that
the marginal product of the latter is only 2.7 times the marginal product of the former.
In the upper half of Figure 6, we plot the compensating diﬀerentials for skilled and unskilled
natives, as the share µS of skilled workers in the immigration surge ranges from zero to one.
The relationship between µS and pS, is decreasing and eﬀectively linear, and between µS and
pU increasing and eﬀectively linear. If the elasticities of substitution were equal between all
the diﬀerent inputs, the two curves would both cross the horizontal axis at µS = .256,t h e
point where the immigration surge exactly replicates the existing population. Instead here,
the two curves cross at µS = .2407, slightly above the horizontal axis. Hence there is a small
region that ranges between µS = .2391 and µS = .2422, where the values of pS and pU are
both positive, and increases in immigration within this narrow band of the skill-distribution
are Pareto improvements (even if there is no mechanism for redistributing part of the surplus).
Obviously, as long as the immigration surge is still raising the share of unskilled workers in the
population, skilled natives beneﬁt because both wages and returns to capital rise. For unskilled
natives, this small region is where the wage decreases are small enough, that they are dominated
by increases in the returns to capital.
The lower half of Figure 6 shows the relationship between µS and p, which is increasing and
very slightly convex. The reason for the convexity is that the more skilled workers within a surge
of immigration, the more the capital stock must rise to accommodate it. Because agents in this
economy wish to smooth consumption over time, savings do not adjust linearly. Therefore the


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8For the same reason, the immigration surplus is increasing and convex in the value of  ,w h i c h
regulates the size of the immigration surge. In Table 3 we present values of pS, pU,a n dp as
they vary the value of   between -.00025 and .00025 (in Figure 7 we vary the value of   between
-.00025 and .00025 and the value of µS over the unit interval as well). Anticipating the rise in
the rate of return that accompanies higher immigration, agents temporarily cut consumption
to save more. Similarly, a drop in immigration generates a rise in consumption and a decline
in capital accumulation. These responses are asymmetric–because of the concavity of the
utility function, agents do not forgo consumption to accumulate capital as easily as they raise
consumption to lower their capital-holdings. The result is that capital accumulates more slowly
than it disacumulates, and a rise in immigration raises the rate of return to capital more, than
a drop in immigration causes it to decline. Therefore a cut in the number of immigrants of a
certain type, generates a smaller loss in welfare, than the immigration surplus generated by the
addition of the same number of these people.
Compressing the period of time over which the immigrants arrive, raises the gap between the
eﬀects of the policy on skilled and unskilled natives. If all the skilled immigrants arrive over the
course of only three years, the losses to the skilled native population rise to 0.1424%, and the
gains to unskilled increase to 0.1338%. Similarly, raising the time span causes both the gains
and losses to slightly decline. The lower the value of T, the higher the rate of return to capital,
but over a shorter period of time. Overall average native households beneﬁt from the greater
degree of capital dilution, but the changes to the surplus are quantitatively insigniﬁcant.
Under its present conﬁguration, the H1-B visa program brings 650,000 skilled workers to
the United States in a decade. Suspending the program means lowering the overall number of
immigrant arrivals by just under seven percent, and lowering the number of skilled immigrants
by just under 27%. For the 25.6% of the population that is skilled, and already enjoys high
earnings, the welfare gain is equivalent to permanently raising their consumption by 0.296%.
The 74.4% of the population that is unskilled, loses the equivalent of 0.279%. Translated into
dollars, shutting down the program for one decade, generates a transfer of wealth of $294 billion
from the unskilled to the skilled and an overall welfare loss of just over $2.5 billion. In per-capita
terms this works out to a one-time payment of $3,888 for each member of a skilled household
paid for by the losses sustained by their unskilled counterparts of $1,357 each. The overall
welfare loss, measured as the surplus per skilled worker that never immigrated is $3,886.
Consider by contrast, a doubling of the existing H1-B visa program for ten-years, so that
under its auspices 130,000 skilled workers arrive per year, or 1.3 million during the decade. The
transfer between the two groups is almost identical in size–$292 billion, but passes in the other
direction, from the high paid skilled minority, to the lower paid unskilled majority. The rise
29Figure 7: The compensating diﬀerentials, pS and pU from (13), and immigration surplus p from (15),
as a function of the changes in the rates of immigration ranging between a drop and a rise of 2.5 per-ten
























































































eraDecadeDuration of the Policy T =1 T =3 T =5 T =1 5
Thousands of Additional
Immigrants per Annum 295 98.33 59 19.67
















































Table 4: Compensating diﬀerentials generated by the addition of an additional two hundred thousand
and ninety-ﬁve thousand immigrants to the underlying immigration ﬂow over the course of T years.
in welfare is nearly twice as large, an overall beneﬁto fﬁve billion dollars. The surplus per
additional immigrant is $7,644.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
The results in the previous sections demonstrate that, given the elasticities of substitution
between the input factors estimated by Krusell et. al. (2000), a rise in skilled immigration over
and above the pre-existing ﬂow, generates an immigration surplus, just over twelve times greater
than the surplus generated by the same number of unskilled immigrants. In this section, we
consider how robust this conclusion is to alternative values for the elasticities of substitution.
The impulse responses in Figure 9 describe the reaction of factor returns to, once again, the
29,500 per annum, ten-year increase in the inﬂow of skilled immigrants for diﬀerent elasticities
of substitution: when both elasticities of substitution are low (σSK = .5,σ UK =1 .5)o rh i g h
(σSK =1 ,σ UK =2 ), and for each high and low combination, (σSK = .5,σ UK =2 ), and
(σSK =1 ,σ UK =1 .5). The general pattern of the impulse responses–a monotonic rise in
(the detrended value of) unskilled wages, a sharp drop in (the detrended value of) skilled wages
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2All values of σSK σSK=.5 σSK=.75 σSK=1
cUK cUU cKK cSK cSS cSK
UK cSK cSS cSK
UK cSK cSS cSK
UK
σUK=1.5 0.67 -1.69 -0.80 1.52 -3.35 0.85 1.18 -2.77 0.52 0.96 -2.38 0.29
σUK=1.75 0.57 -1.45 -0.68 1.41 -3.06 0.84 1.12 -2.56 0.55 0.92 -2.22 0.35
σUK=2 0.50 -1.27 -0.60 1.31 -2.81 0.81 1.07 -2.37 0.57 0.89 -2.08 0.39
Table 5: The relationship between cross and own Allen-Hicks partial elasticities of complimen-
tarity and the cross partial elasticities of substition for the two-level CES production function:
cUS = cUK = 1
σUK, cSK =
(1−φSK)(σUK−σSK)+σUK
σUK(φSKσSK−(1−φSK)σUK), cUU = −
1−φU









return to the long run rate of 4%–are all qualitatively robust to diﬀerent values of σSK and
σUK. The magnitudes of the impulse responses do vary with the values of the elasticities we
choose, but these quantitative diﬀerences are best understood in the context of the Allen-Hicks
partial elasticities of complementarity.18
Both the short and long-run impacts of an inﬂux of skilled immigrants on the wages of skilled
workers, are directly related to the absolute value of the own-price complementarity of skilled
labor cSS in Table 5. If both elasticities are low (σSK = .5,σ UK =1 .5), the value of cSS is -3.35,
and by year ten when all the two hundred and ninety-ﬁve thousand additional immigrants have
joined the economy, skilled wages are .34% lower than they otherwise would be. Once again,
as capital accumulates to accommodate the additional workers, skilled wages recover some lost
ground, but in the long-run remain .21% below their previous trend.
Similarly, the wages for unskilled workers rise the most following an inﬂux of skilled im-
migrants, when the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor is highest (and sub-
stitution is lowest). The way the stock of capital responds over time to the inﬂux of skilled
immigrants, also has an indirect eﬀect on the reaction of unskilled wages. The higher the
complementarity between the skilled immigrant’s labor and capital, the greater the rise in the
18Partial elasticities of substitution measure the rate at which one factor is substituted for another fol-
lowing a shift in relative factor prices, assuming that total output and other factor prices remain constant.
We are studying the eﬀects of exogenous changes in the supply of inputs–immigrant labor. Therefore
even though one input, capital, is not ﬁxed in the long-run, the partial elasticities of complementarity–
the relative changes in factor prices following a change in the ratio of inputs (with marginal costs and
other inputs constant)–provide a more useful guide for understanding the behavior of the model, than
the more commonly reported and estimated elasticities of substitution.
33capital stock. Capital and unskilled labor are relative substitutes, but still complement each
other. Hence the combination of low substitution b e t w e e ns k i l l e da n du n s k i l l e dl a b o r ,a n dh i g h
complementarity between capital and unskilled labor (corresponding to σSK = .5,σ UK =1 .5)
implies the highest rise in wages in the short-run, .12%, and the long-run, .16%.
In a static model, the response of the return to capital to an increase in skilled immigration
would be both permanent, and solely determined, by the degree of complementarity between
capital and skilled labor. Here, with capital adjusting through changes in savings, temporary
inﬂuxes do not aﬀect the long-run rate of return, and though the short-run rate of return is
determined primarily by the elasticity of complementarity between capital and skilled labor, the
own price complementarity of capital plays a role as well. This additional factor also inﬂuences
the immigration surplus.
If the elasticities of substitution are σSK = .5 and σUK =1 .5, the elasticity of complementar-
ity between skilled labor and capital is highest, cSK =1.52, and by year ten, the inﬂux of skilled
immigrants raises the rate of return to capital by 1.08 basis points. The more the elasticity of
substitution between skilled labor and capital rises, the lower the elasticity of complementar-
ity, and the lower the short-run response of the rate of return. If σSK =1and σUK =1 .5,
then cSK =0.96, and the rate of return to capital rises by no more than 0.57 of a basis point.
However, holding constant the value of σSK, while raising the value of σUK lowers the value of
cSK, but the own price complementarity of capital is dropping (in absolute value) with increases
in σUK,a n dt h i se ﬀect dominates. The lower (in absolute value) is cKK,t h el e s st h er a t eo f
return is responsive to the additional capital that is gradually accumulating to accommodate
the additional workers. If σSK = .5 and σUK =2 ,t h e ncSK is only 1.31, but in year ten the
rate of return is 1.11 basis points above its long-run value.
The response of unskilled wages to an inﬂux of unskilled immigrants, is primarily determined
by the value of cUU–the higher its value (in absolute value) the greater the drop in unskilled
wages. The largest long-run decline in unskilled wages, 0.055%, occurs where both the elasticities
of substitution are low (σSK = .5 and σUK =1 .5), and the smallest decline, 0.039%, occurs where
both elasticities are high (σSK =1and σUK =2 ). A secondary determining factor is the relative
complementarity between skilled labor and capital, when compared to the complementarity
between unskilled labor and capital: cSK
UK=cSK-cUK. The higher the value of cSK
UK, the greater
the drop in unskilled wages.
The complementarity between unskilled and skilled workers, cUS (equal to cUK), is what
primarily determines the response of skilled wages to the inﬂux of unskilled immigrants. If
σSK = .5 and σUK =1 .5, the complementarity between the two types of labor is high, and long-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5σSK = .5 σSK = .75 σSK =1
























































































































Table 6: Compensating diﬀerentials generated by the addition of an additional two million skilled
immigrants to the underlying immigration ﬂow over the course of ten years, for diﬀerent elasticities of
substitution.
36If σUK =2 , the rise is almost a third smaller–only 0.046%. Again the value of cSK
UK plays a
secondary role, the higher its value, the greater the rise in skilled wages. The rate of return
to capital changes only slightly, regardless what parameters we choose, ranging from .082 of a
basis point if σSK = .5 and σUK =2 ,t o. 1 2 5o fab a s i sp o i n ti fσSK =1and σUK =1 .
What do these patterns of factor returns imply for welfare? The simple answer is that for
both inﬂuxes of skilled and unskilled immigrants, there is a monotonic, and direct relationship,
between the rise in the returns to capital, and the size of the immigration surplus. In fact,
the larger the surplus from high-skilled immigration, the smaller the surplus from low-skilled
immigration. High skilled immigration generates the highest surplus, equivalent to a 0.0012%
increase in permanent consumption, when the elasticities of substitution are σSK = .5 and
σUK =2 , and low-skilled immigration generates the lowest surplus, 4.4 × 10−5,w i t ht h e s ev e r y
same elasticities. Skilled immigrants generate a surplus that is twenty-seven times the surplus
generated by unskilled immigrants.
High-skilled immigration generates the lowest increase in the immigration surplus, 7.5×10−4
if the values of the elasticities are σSK =1and σUK =1 .5, and these are the elasticities
that correspond to the highest surpluses generated by unskilled immigration, 1.4 × 10−4.H e r e
the immigration surplus from skilled immigration is only 5.4 times the surplus generated by
unskilled immigration. This gap, though only half what is generated in the baseline model, is
still substantial, considering that the skilled workers are only 2.7 times more productive than
the unskilled.
In summary, these results demonstrate that for a wide range of elasticities, high-skilled
immigrants generate far higher surpluses than low-skilled immigrants, far higher than implied
by simple comparisons of their marginal products, and before even considering their diﬀerential
impact on government expenditure and revenue.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Soaring populations, stagnant economies, and unstable politics throughout much of the unde-
veloped world have combined with ever cheaper transportation costs to produce a vast pool of
people desperate to migrate to the West. Most of these people have little formal education–they
possess little but a willingness to work very long hours at the most menial jobs. A minority,
however, possess suﬃcient education, technical knowledge or entrepreneurial skills to quickly
join the professional class of any Western society willing to admit them.
Consider competing proposals by Borjas (1999b) and Storesletten (1999) to reform U.S.
immigration policy. Borjas advocates a large cut in the overall rate of immigration; remaining
37visas would be allocated through a points system designed to give greater precedence to potential
immigrants with skills over unskilled people with family ties to current U.S. citizens. Such
a policy would reduce wage inequality and might be eﬃcient as well–the heavy reliance of
unskilled immigrants on social services overwhelms whatever small surpluses he believes they
generate. Storesletten advocates a dramatic increase in the number of skilled immigrants–if a
suﬃciently large number of college-educated foreigners are permitted to migrate to the United
States, long-run ﬁscal imbalances can be resolved without tax increases or cuts in social insurance
beneﬁts.19
The two proposals share a common element–increasing the ratio of skilled to unskilled
immigrants lowers the tax burden.20 This paper does not address ﬁscal policy, but its conclusions
complement those that do. Raising the ratio of skilled to unskilled immigrants has the potential
to both lower the gap in income between skilled and unskilled workers and to generate as
signiﬁcant rise in the immigration surplus. Furthermore these eﬀects are largely due to either
the complementarity between skilled labor and capital, or the degree to which unskilled labor is
a substitute for capital. As production technologies continue to evolve, the dichotomous welfare
eﬀects generated by diﬀerent types of immigration may very well intensify. Given recent trends
in immigration policy, it seems that Western governments increasingly intuit this.
Not very long ago, indeed as late as 1973, the West German government actively encouraged
its industrial ﬁr m st or e c r u i tm i l l i o n so fg u e s tw o r k e r st om a ns h o pﬂoors and assembly lines.
The German population is now ageing rapidly, and generous social welfare payments leave the
less-educated among German workers with little incentive to accept menial low-paying jobs.
Nonetheless it is hard to imagine any present-day German government ready to contemplate
negotiating agreements with developing countries to once more supply millions of unskilled
Gastarbeiten. Instead, the German government is proposing to recruit far smaller numbers of
high-skilled professionals to permanently settle in Germany, and help develop and sustain its
high tech sector.
Here is an important distinction. The Bracero programs (1942-1964) brought agricultural
workers to the United States with the full agreement and cooperation of the Mexican government;
likewise, between 1955 and 1968, Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia
each signed agreements to facilitate the migration of their citizens to Germany. Immigrants
19Storesletten (1999) calculates that if the rate of skilled immigrants between the ages of 25 to 49 is increased
11-fold, the United States can avoid raising the tax rate by 4.4%.
20Dolmas and Huﬀman (2003) and Ortega (2003), (2004) tackle the question of voting for diﬀerent immigration
policies in the context of redistributive politics. Though we do not consider the implications of immigrant political
enfranchisement or taxation, we do provide some infrastructure for further work on the subject–in particular
vis-a-vis unskilled immigration.
38alleviated perceived labor shortages in the West, while sending home hard currency in the form
of remittances.
No more. Our results suggest that as far as immigration policy is concerned, conﬂict rather
than cooperation may increasingly become the norm. U.S. immigration policy is no longer a
purely domestic issue. Instead, Mexico’s President lobbies his U.S. counterpart to gain more
visas for his country’s low-skilled workers, and legalize the status of undocumented aliens as well.
Meanwhile, recent Canadian eﬀorts to recruit physicians from South Africa met with intense
resistance, and led to a diplomatic crisis between the two countries.
How will the nations of the developing world respond if Western countries continue to erect
new hurdles to immigration as a whole, even as they intensify their eﬀorts to lure away these
same countries’ small numbers of highly productive workers? What steps will they employ to
stop them? In its 2001 Human Development Report, the United Nations Development Program
revived a proposal, ﬁrst advanced by Jagdish Bhagwati in 1972, to tax emigrants from less
developed countries or the foreign ﬁrms that recruit them.
During the 1980’s, the government of Taiwan actively encouraged and subsidized eﬀorts to
repatriate engineers and scientists who had moved abroad in previous decades. In all likelihood
some countries will seek to emulate the Taiwanese example; hopefully none will resort to harsh
Soviet-style travel restrictions. The late Julian Simon referred to human ingenuity as ‘the
ultimate resource’. The struggle to control who will enjoy its beneﬁts may yet deﬁne the history
of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
399A p p e n d i x
Because the sets of equations for each type are similar, the condition number of the 4×4 Jacobian
matrix can be very high–leading to inaccurate results. For numerical simulations we replace
the two equations in (6) with a law of motion for the logarithm of consumption for unskilled
households aU (t)=l n˜ cU (t), and a law of motion for the ratio between the present values of
skilled and unskilled labor income χ(t)=
ωS(t)
ωU(t).
˙ aU (t)=r(t) − ρ − x − (ρ − n)e−aU(t)˜ kU(t)mU (t)κU (t) (16)
˙ χ(t)=( ρ − n)
χ(t)˜ wU (t) − ˜ wS (t)
eaU(t) − (ρ − n)˜ kU (t)
(17)
·
˜ kU (t)= ˜ wU(t)+( r(t) − n − x − mU (t)κU (t))˜ kU (t) − eaU(t) (18)
·
˜ kS (t)= ˜ wS(t)+( r(t) − ρ − x − mS (t)κS (t))˜ kS (t)+
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˜ kUΩK + lUΩU
˜ kSΩK + lSΩS






(πS (z) − πU (z))dz






































∂ aU(0, ,π) − (ρ − n)e−aUκU˜ kULv [πU]
∂
∂ χ(0, ,π)
− κU˜ kULv [πU]
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˜ kUΩK + lUΩU
˜ kSΩK + lSΩS
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   

=0 ,j= {1,2} (22)
where υ1 and υ2 are the two positive eigenvalues of the matrix J. Solving the system yields for
























































˜ kUΩK + lUΩU







(πS (u) − πU (u))dudz.






∂  ,a n d
∂˜ kS(t, ,π)
∂  we obtain second-order
approximations by diﬀerentiating the system twice by  :



























∂ ∂ aU(t, ,π)
∂2





































































∂  ,a n d
∂˜ kS(t, ,π)
∂  and sec-
ond and third derivatives of the production function, and {Γ4,1,Γ4,2,Γ4,3,Γ4,4} are functions of
second and third derivatives of the production function.We then repeat this process again to
obtain third-order approximations.
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